A theoretical model is used to explore the determinants of the optimum size of a private research park and the effect of university affiliation on that optimum size. Parks are assumed to operate as cooperatives where costs are equally shared among the member firms, and optimality occurs when the firms" average net benefits are maximized. To achieve this, existing members of a park will limit the park"s size, denying entry to firms who wish to join and are willing to share the costs. University affiliation may either increase or decrease the optimum size of a park.
INTRODUCTION
Research parks can have a significant impact on commercial research and development activities and are an important component of a nation"s innovation system.
1 By providing a venue for research firms and organizations to operate in close proximity, they enable easier communication among professionals in different organizations, enhancing the research productivity of all of them. They enable communities to leverage technology-based growth into economic development, and they facilitate advancement through the stages of technology-based economic activity by reducing relevant market transactions especially with respect to technical labor.
2 These benefits have made the development of research parks a goal of public policy in the United States and in other countries. On July 22, 2004, Senator Bingaman introduced a Bill, S. 2737, "The Science Park Administration Act of 2004," to facilitate the development of science parks. The premise on which the Bill was based is: "It is in the best interests of the Nation to encourage the formation of science parks to promote the clustering of innovation through high technology activities." Building on the premise of S. 2737, Senator Pryor introduced on May 11, 2007 a Bill, S. 1373, the "Building a Stronger America Act." S. 1373 provides grants and loan guarantees for the development and construction of science parks to promote the clustering of innovation through high technology activities. As of 2002, the United States had 81 parks operating with approximately 30 additional planned. University involvement in creating and managing research parks is widespread but not universal. Their importance highlights the needs for more knowledge about how science parks "work," who locates within a park and why, and the scope of leverage that parks provide tenants and the region where they are located. In the United States, at least, park formation is growing and gaining increased public policy attention. Leyden, Link and Siegel (2008) have provided an initial theoretical examination of why a firm locates in a university research park. This paper examines the issue of what determines the size of a research park and how that size is effected by the presence (or absence) of university involvement. Given the importance of research parks, the issue of their size and of the impact of university involvement on that size is relevant to issues of efficient allocation of economic resources.
THE MODEL
The model of the research park developed in this paper is based on the economic theory of clubs. See Sandler and Tschirhart (1980) for a survey of this literature. For members of a private research park, the value of belonging to the park is the opportunity it affords to engage in synergistic R&D activities that can increase the members" profits. There are also, of course, costs of establishing and operating a research park. We assume these costs are shared equally among the members. The objective of a private research park, we assume, is to maximize the average net benefit of the park members. Average net benefit (ANB) is defined to be total R&D benefits to members of the park divided by the number of member firms (AB) minus the average (per firm) cost of establishing and operating the research park (AC). Both the average benefit from joining the park and the average cost of running the park will depend on the number of firms who join the park, N.
For the range of park members around the optimal level, diminishing marginal returns would ensure that the average benefits curve from R&D is declining. Initially, the marginal benefit exceeds the average benefit, causing average benefit to increase with increasing park membership. Each new member"s contribution to marginal benefit is lower than that of the previous member, and marginal benefit eventually falls below average benefit, causing the average benefit of adding new members to fall (Figs. 1 and 2) . Average benefit may eventually become asymptotic to some value (possibly zero), but this will occur after average benefit is maximized. Average benefit from R&D collaboration is thus assumed to be a strictly quasiconcave function of N. AB reaches a peak value at N = and then steadily diminishes thereafter:
The total costs of the research park are composed of a fixed component F, consisting of installation and maintenance of basic infrastructure, administrative overhead, etc., and a variable component VC consisting of the costs of park physical maintenance and joint park activities. Let the total variable cost for a park of a given land size be:
The average cost function for the park (Fig. 3) is:
The marginal effect on average cost of admitting a new firm (Fig. 4) into the park is:
For small values of N the marginal effect on average cost of admitting a new firm to the park is negative, but for large values of N it will be positive. Decreases in fixed cost cause the AC curve to shift downward, but from Eq. (5) it is clear that decreases in fixed cost cause the AC′ curve to shift upwards for all values of N. Also note that the AC′ curve is always rising with N:
For a feasible private research park that has the potential to generate positive average net benefits for the firms, we assume the park"s objective function is
The first-order condition for this optimization problem is:
As long as the AC′ curve intersects the AB′ curve from below, as in Figure 5 , the value of N that satisfies the first-order condition will maximize the value of average net benefit. If firms were homogeneous in their ability to benefit from R&D collaboration each firm"s benefit from joining the park would be the average benefit. With free entry into the park, firms would continue to enter until park members" average net benefit was driven down to zero. Figure 6 illustrates the free entry solution where the average cost curve intersects the average benefit curve from below. The equilibrium number of firms under free entry is denoted by N e . Because the optimal number of firms (N*) by assumption generates a positive ANB, N e > N*. A private research park will always seek to restrict the number of firms in the park below the free entry level.
